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1. Introduction
The intergenerational transmission of education and income is a key concern of education
economists and policymakers, with a substantial body of literature demonstrating high
correlations between parental education and child education (Black and Devereux 2010;
Ermisch and Del Bono 2010; Machin and Murphy 2010). For example, the elasticity of child
education with respect to parental education has been shown to be of the order of 0.3 to 0.5 in
the largest meta-analysis conducted to date (Hertz et al. 2007). However, these estimates do
not examine the extent to which parental education influences grade performance within
education attainment levels, or the expected economic return to education.
In this paper we investigate the interaction between socio-economic status and higher
education from matriculation to graduation. We provide new estimates of the magnitude of
the intergenerational relationship between parental education and both grade performance in
university and the expected return from university education. Furthermore, we go further
than much current research in examining the channels through which these transmissions
occur by estimating detailed decompositions of these intergenerational relationships. Along
with standard demographic variables, our decomposition allows for intergenerational
transmission through choice of institute, subject choice, pre-university academic performance
and a wide range of personality traits. There is a growing literature incorporating character
controls into economic models (Borghans et al. 2008), moreover, there is evidence that
personality traits are transmitted from parent to child (Dohmen et al. 2006; Goldsmith et al.
1994). In our decomposition analysis we contribute to this literature by examining whether
personality traits constitute one of the pathways through which intergenerational transmission
of education outcomes occurs.
Firstly, we examine whether university entry mechanisms (where secondary (high)
school exam results are used to allocate places) are predictive of university performance2
controlling for socio-economic status (SES), allowing us to determine whether the university
admission system is based upon academic aptitude or the ability of wealthy families to confer
educational advantage onto their children (Sackett et al., 2009). Secondly, we examine the
magnitude of the socio-economic attainment gaps in university, and the extent to which these
differentials are mitigated through choice of institute, subject choice, prior academic
attainment or character traits. We analyse the extent to which the university system itself
contributes to increasing (or decreasing) socioeconomic attainment gaps among college
students by comparing the attainment gap at entry to college attainment differences. Thirdly,
a large body of literature shows that earnings expectations can both be meaningfully elicited
(e.g. Dominitz and Manski 1996) and predictive of later salaries (Webbink and Hartog 2004),
but there is a socioeconomic gradient in these earnings expectations and in the perceived
economic returns to education (Smith and Powell 1990). We examine in detail whether this
socio-economic gradient in expectations of the returns from education can be explained
through pathways such as choice of institute, subject choice, grade attainment in university or
character traits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualizes the Irish
education system. Section 3 outlines details of the data used in the study and provides
information on various measures used in the analysis. Section 4 outlines the econometric
methodology used and reports the findings from the three key research questions outlined
above and Section 5 concludes.
2. Context – Irish Education System in Brief
The Irish education system is split into primary education (elementary), secondary education
(high-school) and tertiary (higher & further) education. Primary and secondary education is
provided by the State, and while some students attend private fee paying schools the vast
majority attend state funded schools. Students typically attend primary school from the age of3
4 to 12, and attend secondary school from the age of 12 to 18. While there is a minimum
school leaving age of 16 (and an intermediate examination taken at around this age known as
the Junior Certificate, akin to the GCSE/O-Level examination in the United Kingdom), for the
majority of the age cohort (84.7%), the culmination of secondary education is a set of national
exams called the Leaving Certificate which are taken in the final year of secondary school.
1
Seven universities and 15 institutes of technology provide the bulk of tertiary
education in Ireland.
2,3 Following reforms introduced in 1995, undergraduate education is
funded by the State so there is no direct tuition fee for participants.
4 The admission rate to
higher education in Ireland in 2004 was 55 percent, and, despite the reforms that abolished
direct tuition fees, significant socio-economic gradients in participation exist (O’Connell et al.
2006; Denny 2010). There is some evidence of a softening of this gradient - in 1998, some 23
percent of higher education participants came from semi-skilled/unskilled background,
whereas this increased to 40 percent by 2004 (O’Connell et al. 2006). Much of this
participation, however, reflects an increase in the number of places in institutes of technology
(which have a much broader socio-economic representation).
Places on courses in all higher education institutions are blind allocated based on
Leaving Certificate results and managed by an independent agency (the Central Applications
Office).
5 Unlike many admissions systems, such as the US and UK, there is no pre-screening
based on expected results or other extra-curricular activities (such as community engagement,
sporting achievement etc), with the exception of a small number of courses in areas such as
fine art where a portfolio of activity is taken into account. Students apply for up to ten
university, institute of technology or college degree courses in order of preference. They may
1 Adjusted retention estimate of 2001 Junior Cycle intake cohort (Department of Education and Skills 2009).
2 Dublin City University, National University of Ireland Galway, National University of Ireland Maynooth,
Trinity College Dublin, University College Cork, University College Dublin and the University of Limerick.
3 There are also seven teacher-training colleges, one pontifical college, one college of art and design and one
college that provides business related qualifications.
4 However, there is a ‘Student Services Fee’ (or registration fee) of up to €1,500 paid by the student each year.
5 See www.cao.ie4
also apply separately for up to ten sub-degree (diploma/certificate) courses, also in order of
preference.
Typically, students take seven subjects in the Leaving Certificate, and the grades are
converted into points (e.g. A1 = 100 points, A2 = 90 points, etc.). The top six subjects are
summed resulting in a Leaving Certificate ‘point score’ of between 0 and 600. Each degree,
diploma and certificate course has a point threshold which is a function of the number of
places available and the achieved grades of the applicants - specifically, a course with N
places would have a points threshold equal to the actual score of the N
th applicant (ordered
from highest scoring to lowest scoring) for the particular course of study. If a student
achieves above the points threshold for their first choice they are offered this course. If they
do not get enough points for their first choice they are offered the next choice on their list for
which they do have enough points. The preference ordering is adhered to strictly – a student
can move up the list (i.e. move from their second to first preference course is a places become
available) but never downwards.
6 Gormley and Murphy (2006) provide a strong overview of
this system, in particular the nature of the points system.
3. Data and Measurement
This analysis is based on two surveys of students registered at all seven Irish universities that
were conducted by the authors on behalf of the Irish University Association as part of the
Irish Universities Study (IUS).
7 The earlier round of the survey (IUS1), which was carried
out between January and June 2009, is used to analyse student’s earnings expectations, given
the rich battery of personality measures available in that round. The more recent round of the
survey (IUS2), which was carried out between December 2009 and April 2010, is used to
estimate the relationship between grade attainment in university and socio-economic status.
6 If a student applies for both Level 8 and Level 6/Level 7 courses they can receive two offers. There are some
alternative entry routes in university, such as access programmes or mature student entry.
7 The two institutions in Northern Ireland (Queen’s University of Belfast and the University of Ulster) are not
included in our sample.5
In both rounds, from the total university student undergraduate population in Ireland
of approximately 73000 students, 22 percent (16000 students) were randomly sampled.
8 The
response rate of those undergraduate students randomly sampled was 13.4 percent and 18.7
respectively in IUS1 and IUS2. In addition, 3000 undergraduate students who had responded
to earlier survey rounds were invited to participate in the more recent round of the survey
(IUS2). The response rate for this follow-up cohort was 34.1 percent.
9 Focus groups
conducted in the universities indicated that many students who were selected into the survey
do not actively use their University email account. In addition, some students admitted to
routinely not opening e-mails from the university plenary (who contacted them to request
participation) or complained of survey saturation. Therefore, we believe our ‘true’ response
rate is somewhat higher than the actual rate (if we base the rate on the sample actually
successfully contacted).
TABLE 1 HERE
However, given the relatively low response rate, there is a possibility of sampling bias
because the students who actually received the survey and made the choice to participate may
come from non-random backgrounds. In order to explore the potential size and impact of
these sources of sampling bias we compared observables in the survey to that of population
statistics (gender, college and main subject area). Table 1 shows how official Higher
Education Authority (HEA) data from 2008/2009 compares to the Irish Universities Survey
data. The distribution is largely similar; however there are some discrepancies in the response
rate across universities (which focus groups indicated was due to differences in university
email address usage rates across institutions). However, the extent to which the sample
8 There were 72,718 undergraduate students studying in Irish universities in 2009 according to the HEA website;
www.hea.ie
9 Full details on the IUS, including issues on sampling design etc, are available at – see http://www.iua.ie/iua-
activities/studentfeedback.html.6
statistics mirror HEA official statistics provide evidence of the robustness and
representativeness of our data.
The sample used was restricted to Irish full-time undergraduate students who were in
fourth year or below and who were between the ages of seventeen and thirty to minimize
unobserved heterogeneity. This resulted in a sample size of 2472 in IUS1 and 2669 in
IUS2.
10 Table 2 outlines the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the paper. The
left hand side of Table 2 outlines the descriptive statistics for the restricted IUS sample, whilst
the right hand side outlines the key descriptive statistics when missing values for all variables
are dropped (i.e. the estimating sample). As can be seen there is little difference between
these two sets of statistics, suggesting that following our initial sample restrictions, missing
data are randomly distributed across the sample.
TABLE 2 HERE
Self-reported average university grade is our measure of university performance. The
question on grade attainment from IUS2 is: “What was your average result last year in
percent?” For those students who did not answer this question (e.g. 1
st year students) the
dependent variable is expected grade attainment in the current year based on the following
question: “What grade do you expect to obtain this year?” In the estimating sample of IUS2
(used to estimate the relationship between grade and socio-economic status) this ranges from
0 to 98 with a mean of 64.76 and a standard deviation of 10.55.
11,12,13 In our analysis we also
10 Details on the sample selection issues for the two datasets are as follows: IUS1 (IUS2) – Total observations:
4679 (4781); dropping international students – 3873 (4185); restricting to only full-time undergraduate students
in year four or below of study– 2582 (2847); and, restricting the sample to those between aged 17 and 30 – 2472
(2669).
11 We tested for sensitivity in excluding respondents who reported expected rather than realised grade. Results
are quantitatively similar and the main grade decomposition excluding these respondents is shown in Appendix 3
– Table A3 -1.
12 Our data does not provide information on drop-out patterns in university. However, any gradients or
differentials reported in this study are downwards biased by drop-outs if it is predominantly poorly performing,
low SES students who are dropping out of university.
13 Grade attainment is also reported in data set 2, and is used as a control variable in the earnings expectations
analysis. Grade was reported either on a A+, A , A-, B+ etc. scale or a 1
st, 2:1, 2:2, etc. scale and was converted
to a single 4 point grade scale.7
test how earnings expectations are transmitted from parents to students. Students were asked
to report both their short (“What is the annual salary in Euro that you expect to earn in your
first job after graduation?”) and long run (“What is the maximum annual salary in Euro that
you expect to earn over your career?) earnings expectations in current prices. Possible
outcomes were presented to the respondent in bands of €10,000 for short run expectations and
in bands of €20,000 for long run expectations - short run options ranged from €0 to greater
than €100,000, and long run options ranged from €0 to greater than €200,000. In the
estimating sample, the mean (calculated by taking a linear approximation through the mid-
point of the bands) of the short run earnings expectations is €32,104 and the mean of the long-
run earnings expectations is €103,838.
Parental education is reported in the data in terms of qualifications attained. We
convert this into years of education by approximating the years of education necessary to
obtain the reported qualification, e.g. primary school education is considered equivalent to
eight years of completed education. This variable ranges from eight years of education to 19
years of education (for completing a PhD). In most of our analysis, paternal and maternal
years of completed education are summed to provide a single measure. The distribution of
parental education is shown in Figure 1 (drawn from IUS2).
FIGURE 1 HERE
Descriptive statistics of other control variables are also shown in Table 2. Mean
reported Leaving Certificate points are 468 in the both the estimating samples of IUS1 and
IUS2. A number of well-validated and widely used character measures are used in this
analysis. For a review of the use of personality measures in economics see Borghans et al.
(2008). Risk willingness was measured by asking students to report, on a scale of 0-10, how
willing they were to take risks in general, where higher values indicate higher risk
willingness. Dohmen et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence that this measure of risk8
willingness is predictive of risk-taking behaviour, and that it outperforms other measures of
risk preferences. Mean risk willingness is 6.01 in IUS2 and 6.47 in IUS1. In our analysis we
also control for the future orientation of students. This was measured by using a subset of the
questions from the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale (Strathman et al. 1994
– for question wording see Appendix 1). Students responded to four questions relating to how
they think about the future, and reported on a five-point scale. These four responses are
summed, yielding a variable that ranges between 4 and 20 with higher values indicating
higher levels of future orientation. The CFC variable has a mean of 13.72 in IUS2 and 13.53
in IUS1. Finally, in the earnings expectations data set (IUS1), students were asked the Ten
Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al. 2003), a shortened version of the Big Five
Inventory (BFI) personality scale - see Appendix 1 for question wording.
14,15 Through ten
questions, the TIPI scale measures the following five personality traits; extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness on a scale of between 2 and 14.
The mean values of these five traits were extraversion (9.28); agreeableness (6.21);
conscientiousness (10.23); neuroticism (6.68); and openness (10.77).
4. Model and Results
Our basic model of the impact of parental background on the university outcomes of their
children is:
(1) Pi i Si Ei  Xi i,
where P is our measure of student outcome (performance in their degree programme or, in
later specifications, their expectation of future income). This is a function of parental SES
(S); E, an (i x j) matrix of characteristics of the institution and course attended (for example,
14 Gosling et al. (2003) test the TIPI, and found that this personality scale performs well in terms of convergent
and discriminate correlations with the BFI, test-retest reliability and external correlates.
15 The Big Five Inventory personality scale was developed by a number of researchers including Allport &
Odbert (1936), Tupes & Christal (1961), Norman (1963) and Goldberg (1981).9
year of study, subject and college choice); and X, an (i x k) matrix of characteristics of the
student (gender, age, personality measures, etc).
In much of the analysis we report the results in the form of decompositions. This
follows a long tradition in the empirical literature, notably work by Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973). We follow the process outlined by Bowles & Gintis (2002), who decompose
intergenerational income correlation into the direct and indirect effects of parental income on
child income. The indirect effect is the proportion of the total effect that is transmitted
through intermediating variables (e.g. education choices or personality traits). The direct
effect is the remainder of the total effect that can not be explained by intermediating variables.
This approach is based upon the total derivative formula;













where j = 1,2..m. In this formulation, the total effect dy/dz (the total derivative of y with
respect to z) is made up of a direct effect, δy/δz (the partial derivative of y with respect to z),
and an indirect effect, jδy/δxj*(dxj/dz), the partial derivatives of y with respect to xj
multiplied by the derivative of xj with respect to z summed.
We can use this approach to decompose the transmission of SES (measured by
parental education) to grade attainment and earnings expectations into a direct effect and an
indirect effect. Applying the formulation in (2b) to (1), and suppressing individual subscripts






















which decomposes the transmission of parental education to child outcomes into a direct
component, and an indirect component from each of the j education variables and the k
individual characteristics. If parental education is correlated with education variables (such as10
subject or college choice), and/or individual characteristics of the student (such as risk
preferences, future orientation or personality), and if these factors predict child outcomes,
then parental education will have an indirect effect through these variables. To construct
confidence intervals around the direct and indirect estimates, we use bootstrapped, bias-
corrected standard errors, as recommended in the literature (Shrout and Bolger 2002).
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INSERT TABLE 3
Based on (1), Table 3 displays the results of an OLS regression of university grades on
Leaving Certificate points, gender and age. As can be seen, Leaving Certificate points are
highly significant (p-value < 0.01). On average, an extra 100 Leaving Certificate points
increase university grade by approximately 3 percent. As outlined above, if the relationship
between Leaving Certificate performance and grade attainment in university is robust to the
addition of SES controls, then this is an indication that the current admissions system is based
upon academic aptitude rather than simply being a reflection of socio-economic status. As can
be seen in column 2 of Table 3, the relationship between university grade and Leaving
Certificate points is robust to the addition of SES controls. Controlling for combined parental
education has very little effect on the Leaving Certificate coefficient, in fact the coefficient on
Leaving Certificate point increases (0.031 compared to 0.035), and the coefficient remains
highly significant (p-value < 0.01).
INSERT TABLE 4
Turning to the impact of parental education on university grades, the output in Table 4
shows a statistically significant but modest coefficient.
17 An additional year of parental
education increases grade on average by 0.10 of a percentage point, which, while statistically
significant (p-value < 0.1), is a small result. However, the relationship between parental
education and grade performance in university is much stronger for male students (column 2)
16 Bias-corrected bootstrapping with 2000 replications was used in the analysis
17 Partial derivatives corresponding to Table 4 are shown in Table A2-1 of the Appendix, total derivatives are
shown in Table A2-2.11
with an additional year of parental education associated with an increase of 0.22 of a
percentage point for males (p-value < 0.05), but only 0.03 of a percentage point increase for
females, which is statistically insignificant. This table also shows the decomposition of the
differential into an explained (indirect) and an unexplained (direct) component. For the
pooled group of students, 82 percent of the differential is explained by controlling for
demographics (age and gender), education variables (year of study, college, subject and
Leaving Certificate points) and character traits (risk preferences and CFC). The most
important variable in explaining the differential is Leaving Certificate points (this variable
explains > 100% of the pooled differential (p-value < 0.01)).
High SES students perform better in the Leaving Certificate, and Leaving Certificate
points are an important determinant of grade attainment in university (i.e. the partial
derivative of Leaving Certificate points with respect to grade attainment is positive). College
and subject choice actually favour low SES students (contributes -70% to the pooled
differential, but is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.1)). Low SES students are studying
at colleges and are choosing subjects that, all else being equal, would give them higher grades
than high SES students.
Demographics also favour low SES students, since the partial derivatives of gender
and age with respect to grade are both positive, and low SES students are more likely to be
female and older. (Age contributes -21% (p-value < 0.01) to the differential and gender
contributes -1% but is statistically insignificant (p-value > 0.1)). Risk willingness also
favours low SES students (contributes -10% (p-value < 0.05) to the pooled differential), since
high SES students have higher risk preferences, and risk preferences have a negative partial
derivative with respect to grade. Finally, year of study and future orientation do not make a
large contribution in explaining the differential (they explain 1% and 5% of the pooled
differential respectively and neither is significant). In columns 2 and 3 we analyse the12
decomposition separately for male and female students. For male students, less than half
(43%) of the differential is explained by the control variables, whereas for females the total
differential is explained. In fact, females actually experience a negative direct (but
insignificant) intergenerational transmission of grade attainment (-0.036; p-value > 0.1) when
controlling for this set of variables (i.e. controlling for these variables, higher SES female
students are performing worse in university).
INSERT TABLE 5
In Table 5, the transmission of grade attainment is examined separately for maternal
and paternal education. A similar picture emerges, with a large direct transmission from both
maternal and paternal education to grade attainment for males (0.22 and 0.12 respectively,
although neither are statistically significant), but not for females (-0.06 and -0.01 respectively,
again, neither are significant). For male students, the direct effect of maternal education is
nearly twice as large as the direct effect of paternal education. We also decompose the grade
differential using maximum parental education, a specification which allows for the inclusion
of one-parent families. This decomposition yields quantitatively similar results and is shown
in the Appendix 2 (Table A2-3).
INSERT TABLE 6
Table 6 compares the socio-economic gradient in university with the socio-economic
gradient in entry-level scores (Leaving Certificate points). The standardized SES coefficient
from the model of Leaving Certificate points is 0.06 (p-value < 0.01) and the corresponding
figure for the regression of university attainment is 0.01 (p-value < 0.1), indicating that the
SES gradient in secondary school is approximately 6 times greater than the gradient that
exists in university, for the group of students who matriculate. When this is estimated
separately for males and females, the dissipation of the SES gradient is much larger for
females. The male gradient in university is only 3 times smaller than that in secondary school,13
whereas the female gradient is 18 times smaller. These results imply that the SES gradient in
academic performance dissipates to a large extent in university particularly for female
students.
INSERT TABLE 7
Table 7 decomposes the relationship between parental education and short-run
earnings expectations for the full sample as well as separately for males and females.
18
Parental education has a significant and substantial total effect on both short-run and long-run
earnings expectations. An additional year of parental education increases short run earnings
expectations on average by €188 (p-value < 0.01). The magnitude of the total impact of an
additional year of parental education on short run earnings expectations is similar for males
and females, although it is not statistically significant for males (an additional year of parental
education is associated with €142 (p-value > 0.1) and €190 (p-value < 0.05) higher short run
earnings expectations for male and female students respectively).
The vast majority of the socioeconomic gradient (100% in the pooled decomposition;
p-value < 0.01) is explainable by the intermediating variables. As in the grade attainment
decomposition, the most important factor in explaining the differential is Leaving Certificate
points (explains 60% of the pooled differential; p-value < 0.01). This is due to the positive
partial derivative of Leaving Certificate points with respect to short run earnings expectations,
and the positive association between SES and Leaving Certificate performance. College and
subject choice are also important, but in contrast to the grade decomposition, these
intermediate variables now positively contribute 16% to explaining the differential, (p-value >
0.1), although the estimate is not statistically significant. Other significant intermediate
variables are gender, age and risk preferences. While gender and risk preferences help
explain the socio-economic differential in earnings expectations (contributing 8%; p-value <
18 Partial derivatives corresponding to Table 7 are shown in Table A2-4 of the Appendix, and total derivatives in
Table A2-514
0.1 and 8%; p-value < 0.05 respectively), age favours low SES students (-6%; p-value < 0.1).
The five different personality measures contribute differently to the differential, but none are
statistically significant (extraversion 7%; agreeableness 2%; conscientiousness -5%;
neuroticism 1%; openness 0%). Future orientation does not contribute towards explaining the
SES differential in short-run earnings expectations (0%; p-value > 0.1). Interestingly, grade
attainment does not significantly contribute towards explaining the SES short-run earnings
expectations (1%; p-value > 0.1).
INSERT TABLE 8
Table 8 shows this decomposition separately for maternal and paternal education, but
the results give the same quantitative conclusions. Maternal and paternal education increase
short-run earnings expectations for male students, although the estimates are not statistically
significant (€206; p-value > 0.1 and €197; p-value > 0.1 respectively for maternal and
paternal education) and for female students (€288; p-value < 0.1 and €290; p-value < 0.05
respectively). Again, most of this differential (between 51% and 74%) can be explained by
differences in Leaving Certificate performance.
19
INSERT TABLE 9
Table 9 shows the decomposition of the relationship between parental education and
long run earnings expectations.
20 An additional year of parental education increases long run
earnings expectations on average by €2241 (p-value < 0.01). Again, the magnitude of the
estimated total impact is similar for males and females (€1980 and €2203 respectively), with
both estimates being highly significant (p-values < 0.01). Much less of the total effect
between parental education and earnings expectations can be explained in the long run
19 We also decompose the short run earnings expectations differential using maximum parental education; this
decomposition yields quantitatively similar results and is shown in the Appendix 2 (Table A2-6).
20 Partial derivatives corresponding to Table 9 are shown in Table A2-6 of the Appendix, and total derivatives in
Table A2-5.15
compared to the short run. In the long run, just over half (51%; p-value < 0.01) of the total
differential can be explained through intermediating variables. Slightly more of the male
differential is explained compared to the female differential (57%; p-value < 0.05 versus 42%;
p-value < 0.01). The most important factors in explaining the differential are again Leaving
Certificate points (27% of the pooled differential; p-value < 0.01) and college and subject
choice (12% of the pooled differential; p-value > 0.1), although this contribution is not
statistically significant.
As in the short run decomposition, gender and risk preferences significantly contribute
to explaining the long run differential (5%, p-value < 0.05 and 2%; p-value < 0.05
respectively). In the long run, the personality trait extraversion is statistically significant in
explaining the differential (2%; p-value < 0.05), with this trait being particularly important in
the female decomposition (3%; p-value < 0.05 compared to 1%; p-value > 0.1 for males).
The partial derivative of extraversion with respect to long run earnings expectations is
significant and positive, and high SES students are more likely to classify themselves as being
extraverted. None of the other four personality traits make a large contribution in explaining
the differential (contributions are all  |1%| and insignificant), nor does future orientation
(0%; p-value > 0.1), age (-1%; p-value > 0.1), year of study (1%, p-value > 0.1) or grade (1%,





This paper analyses the interaction between socio-economic status and higher education,
focusing on the entry mechanism into higher education, the academic performance of students
in university, and finally, the expected future returns from attending university. The paper
21 The long run decomposition using maximum parental education is shown in Table A2-7 of Appendix 2.16
also analyses the various mechanisms through which intergenerational transmissions of grade
attainment and expected earnings occur, using detailed decompositions that incorporate
personality measures, institutional and subject choice, and prior academic performance.
The current university admissions process was found to be predictive of academic
performance in university, and the relationship is robust to the addition of SES controls. This
is an indication that the current admissions system is efficient in allocating places in
university based on academic aptitude. A small, but significant and positive, gradient was
observed between academic achievement in university and SES - on average, 10 years of
additional combined parental education is associated with a one-percentage point higher
university grade outcome. The relationship between SES and grade attainment in university is
much stronger for males than for females. Additionally, maternal education level is more
important than paternal education level in predicting educational attainment in university for
male students. Comparison of this socio-economic gradient to the gradient that exists prior to
university entry suggests any observed penalty declines significantly over the course of the
student’s time at University, particularly for female students. We do not find much evidence
that SES differences in personality traits, such as risk preferences or conscientiousness,
contribute to explaining socio-economic differentials in grade performance.
Importantly, despite the lack of robust evidence of a persistent socio-economic penalty
during university, there is a large, significant and persistent differential in terms of the
earnings expectations of different socio-economic cohorts. The difference in long-run
expected earnings is €2,241 per year of additional parental education, or approximately two
percent of the long-run expected income level. Given an average return of approximately
eight percent to higher education (Walker and Zhu 2003), the expected earnings return from
parental education is around 25 percent of the actual individual return from higher education.
While some of this differential is mediated by our extensive set of demographic, education17
and personality controls, nearly half of the total effect persists as a direct or unexplained
effect.
This differential might be interpreted as evidence that low SES students are
anticipating discrimination upon entry into the labour market, or alternatively are genuinely
underestimating their returns. This poses a problem for policy makers trying to equalise
education attainment across socio-economic cohorts - students make educational choices
partly based upon the expected returns from education, and since low SES students have
lower expected returns from higher education, unequal participation of low SES cohorts in
higher education may reflect rational behaviour on their part based on their own expectations.
A further issue is that lowered earnings expectations might result in lower realised earnings
due to self-fulfilling expectations. Since we control for grade attainment in our analysis, our
findings suggest that even if educational attainment is equalised across socio-economic
groups, labour market outcomes may not be equalised.
An important direction for further research is to examine the extent to which
expectations are self-fulfilling and the extent to which this can explain intergenerational
transmission of income, or whether they are a function of anticipated discrimination in the
labour market. The results of this paper rule out many traditional explanations of why lower
SES students would expect to earn less but still leaves open the possibility that they are
rationally embedding labour market discrimination or other unobserved labour market
disadvantages into their expectations. In countries with increasing college participation, such
effects take on increasing relevance in examining the processes of intergenerational
transmission and social mobility.18
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Table 1: Checking Data Robustness: IUS Data versus HEA Data
Gender IUS Data Set 2 (09/10) HEA 2009 IUS Data Set 1 (08/09) HEA 2008
Male 37% 43% 36% 42%
Female 63% 57% 64% 58%
University
DCU 6% 9% 6% 9%
NUIG 12% 16% 16% 16%
NUIM 12% 8% 10% 7%
TCD 19% 15% 18% 15%
UCC 20% 18% 17% 18%
UCD 24% 23% 23% 23%
UL 7% 12% 10% 11%
Subject
Education 2% 4% 3% 5%
Humanities & Arts 23% 25% 24% 25%
Social Science 11% 7% 10% 6%
Business 11% 13% 12% 13%
Law 4% 6% 5% 7%
Science 16% 12% 15% 11%
Maths 3% 1% 2% 1%
Computing 3% 3% 3% 3%
Engineering 7% 8% 8% 8%
Agriculture 2% 2% 2% 2%
Health 15% 18% 12% 18%
Sport 0% 0% 1% 0%
Other 3% 2% 4% 2%22
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Restricted Sample Estimating Sample
Grade Analysis (IUS2) Obs Mean σ Obs Mean σ
Father's Years Education 2448 13.60 3.01 1866 13.62 2.98
Mother's Years Education 2501 13.93 2.43 1866 13.96 2.41
Combined Parental Education 2397 27.50 4.67 1866 27.59 4.64
Maximum Parental Education 2552 14.73 2.49 1866 14.78 2.46
Gender 2669 0.62 0.49 1866 0.62 0.48
Age 2669 20.39 2.12 1866 20.44 2.08
Year 2669 2.33 1.05 1866 2.40 1.05
College 2669 - - 1866 - -
Subject 2666 - - 1866 - -
University Grade (%) 2082 64.65 10.52 1866 64.76 10.55
Leaving Certificate Points 2610 463.67 78.94 1866 468.49 76.93
Risk Willingness 2379 6.04 1.86 1866 6.01 1.86
Consideration of Future Consequences 2323 13.61 3.45 1866 13.72 3.46
Earnings Analysis (IUS1) Obs Mean σ Obs Mean σ
Father's Years Education 2261 13.48 2.99 1873 13.52 2.98
Mother's Years Education 2300 13.80 2.48 1873 13.79 2.46
Combined Parental Education 2219 27.25 4.73 1873 27.31 4.70
Maximum Parental Education 2342 14.60 2.53 1873 14.65 2.50
Gender 2472 0.64 0.48 1873 0.65 0.48
Age 2472 20.29 2.00 1873 20.30 1.96
Year 2472 2.26 1.09 1873 2.30 1.09
College 2472 - - 1873 - -
Subject 2467 - - 1873 - -
University Grade (Converted to approx %) 2210 63.43 10.52 1873 63.65 10.53
Leaving Certificate Points 2394 464.92 73.46 1873 467.62 73.55
Risk Willingness 2229 6.47 1.73 1873 6.47 1.71
Extraversion 2228 9.22 2.71 1873 9.28 2.70
Agreeableness 2228 6.23 2.22 1873 6.21 2.22
Conscientiousness 2228 10.21 2.61 1873 10.23 2.61
Neuroticism 2228 6.67 2.79 1873 6.68 2.81
Openness 2229 10.74 2.07 1873 10.77 2.06
Consideration of Future Consequences 2212 13.43 3.63 1873 13.53 3.66
First Salary Expectation 2063 31,869 13,990 1873 32,104 14,085
Maximum Salary Expectation 2062 102,958 51,042 1871 103,838 50,79623
Table 3: Efficiency of Admissions System
(1) (2)
VARIABLES University Grade University Grade














Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table reports the results from two linear models of grade attainment. The first column estimates the
relationship between university grade attainment and secondary school performance (as measured by Leaving
Certificate points), and also controls for a set of demographic controls. The second column estimates the same
model, but includes sum years of parental education to control for socio-economic status. University grade is
measured on a scale of between 0 – 100, therefore the coefficient on Leaving Certificate implies that 100
additional Leaving Certificate points is associated with a 3% higher grade in university.24
Table 4: Grade Decomposition using Summed Parental Education
(1) (2) (3)
Total Sample % Male % Female %
Beta 0.097* 100% 0.219** 100% 0.030 100%
Decomposition
Direct 0.017 18% 0.125 57% -0.036 -120%
Total Indirect 0.080 82% 0.094 43% 0.065 220%
Indirect
Gender -0.001 -1%
Age -0.021*** -21% -0.033* -15% -0.015* -52%
Year 0.001 1% -0.010 -4% 0.006 20%
Leaving Certificate 0.173*** 178% 0.192*** 87% 0.160*** 540%
Risk Willingness -0.009** -10% -0.001 0% -0.008 -27%
CFC 0.005 5% 0.017 8% 0.000 1%
College & Subject -0.068 -70% -0.070 -32% -0.078 -263%
Observations 1866 701 1165
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of grade decompositions. The first column estimates the
decomposition for the entire sample. The second column estimates the same model for male students only and
the final column estimates the model for female students only. Standard errors were computed using
bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications. In all decompositions, the first stage total effect of SES on
gender is estimated using a linear probability model. As college and subject are categorical, estimation of
individual college or subject contributions are not estimated. The combined effects of college and subject choice
are estimated as the residual of the total effect less the direct effect and the sum of the other indirect effects.25
Table 5: Grade Decomposition using Father and Mother’s Education Separately












Beta 0.129 100% 0.158 100% 0.247* 100% 0.064 100% 0.389** 100% 0.035 100%
Decomposition
Direct 0.033 26% 0.026 16% 0.121 49% -0.013 -20% 0.215 55% -0.060 -172%
Indirect 0.096 74% 0.132 84% 0.126 51% 0.077 120% 0.174 45% 0.095 272%
Indirect
Gender -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1%
Age -0.027** -21% -0.029** -19% -0.048* -19% -0.019* -29% -0.046 -12% -0.022 -63%
Year 0.005 4% -0.004 -3% -0.004 -1% 0.009 13% -0.030 -8% 0.008 23%
Leaving Certificate 0.231*** 179% 0.269*** 170% 0.263*** 106% 0.216*** 336% 0.351*** 90% 0.222*** 639%
Risk Willingness -0.013* -10% -0.018* -11% -0.004 -2% -0.009 -15% -0.001 0% -0.017 -49%
CFC 0.007 5% -0.086 -55% 0.024 10% -0.001 -1% 0.009 2% 0.001 4%
College & Subject -0.106 -82% 0.004 2% -0.106 -43% -0.118 -184% -0.109 -28% -0.098 -282%
Observations 1904 1941 721 1183 732 1209
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of grade decompositions. The first column uses father’s education level as the explanatory variable. The second column
estimates the same model but uses mother’s education level as the explanatory variable. Columns 3-6 estimate these two model specifications separately for male and female
respondents. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.26
Table 6: Grade Gradient: Comparing School & University



















Parental Education 0.060*** 0.009* 0.059*** 0.020** 0.060*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.580)
Female 0.098** 0.034
(0.014) (0.473)
Age 0.748*** -0.489*** 0.736*** -0.705*** 0.742*** -0.362**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.028)
Age^2 -0.019*** 0.011*** -0.019*** 0.016*** -0.018 *** 0.008**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032)
Observations 2342 1914 883 713 1459 1201
P-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table reports the results from a number of linear models of grade attainment both prior to university and
in university. Reported coefficients are standardized regression coefficients with the outcome variables in measured
in standard deviations.27
Table 7: Short-Run Earnings Decomposition using Summed Parental Education
(1) (2) (3)
Total Sample % Male % Female %
Beta 187.524*** 100% 142.126 100% 190.027** 100%
Decomposition
Direct 0.526 0% 9.493 7% 15.127 8%
Indirect 186.998*** 100% 132.633 93% 174.900** 92%
Indirect
Gender 14.850* 8%
Age -11.537* -6% -0.276 0% -20.383* -11%
Year 14.842 8% 12.720 9% 16.027 8%
Leaving Certificate 111.909*** 60% 72.886* 51% 132.088*** 70%
Risk Willingness 15.447** 8% 26.401 19% 8.523 4%
Grade 1.989 1% -9.427 -7% 4.749 2%
Extraversion 12.433 7% -3.246 -2% 21.917* 12%
Agreeableness 3.151 2% 10.802 8% -1.181 -1%
Conscientiousness -8.446 -5% -28.380 -20% 0.613 0%
Neuroticism 1.436 1% 6.276 4% -2.443 -1%
Openness 0.631 0% 5.108 4% -0.978 -1%
CFC -0.184 0% -0.194 0% 0.339 0%
College & Subject 30.477 16% 39.963 28% 15.629 8%
Observations 1873 658 1215
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of short run earnings expectations. The first
column estimates the decomposition for the entire sample. The second column estimates the same model for male
students only and the final column estimates the model for female students only. Standard errors were computed
using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.28
Table 8: Short-Run Earnings Decomposition using Father and Mother’s Education Separately














Beta 290.783*** 100% 262.099** 100% 196.768 100% 290.296** 100% 206.484 100% 288.109* 100%
Decomposition
Direct 34.538 12% -30.113 -11% -4.205 -2% 65.371 23% 17.364 8% -11.517 -4%
Indirect 256.245** 88% 292.212** 111% 200.973 102% 224.926* 77% 189.119 92% 299.625* 104%
Indirect
Gender 34.772** 12% 2.920 1%
Age -10.817 -4% -24.753* -9% 3.803 2% -21.971* -8% -4.553 -2% -38.349* -13%
Year 2.241 1% 47.085** 18% 9.531 5% -1.623 -1% 27.404 13% 58.121** 20%
Leaving Certificate 151.363*** 52% 180.971*** 69% 99.876* 51%
180.028**
* 62% 108.159* 52%
212.581**
* 74%
Risk Willingness 20.857* 7% 23.825* 9% 37.777 19% 9.762 3% 30.516 15% 18.733 7%
Grade 2.303 1% 3.232 1% -15.094 -8% 9.053 3% -19.280 -9% 3.745 1%
Extraversion 19.526* 7% 20.065 8% -6.566 -3% 32.379* 11% 1.126 1% 34.676* 12%
Agreeableness 4.284 1% 4.260 2% 7.668 4% -0.631 0% 31.464 15% -1.850 -1%
Conscientiousness -8.467 -3% -19.016 -7% -23.378 -12% 0.697 0% -68.036* -33% 0.783 0%
Neuroticism 2.126 1% 2.178 1% 12.040 6% -1.942 -1% 0.313 0% -3.430 -1%
Openness 1.035 0% -0.312 0% 8.390 4% -1.528 -1% 2.764 1% -3.161 -1%
CFC 0.982 0% -1.888 -1% 0.197 0% 1.724 1% 0.007 0% -1.708 -1%
College & Subject 36.040 12% 53.646 20% 66.730 34% 18.976 7% 79.236 38% 19.485 7%
Observations 1901 1944 675 1226 685 1259
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of short run earnings expectations. The first column uses father’s education level as the explanatory
variable. The second column estimates the same model but uses mother’s education level as the explanatory variable. Columns 3-6 estimate these two model specifications
separately for male and female respondents. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.29
Table 9: Long-Run Earnings Decomposition using Summed Parental Education
(1) (2) (3)
Total Sample % Male % Female %
Beta 2241.435*** 100% 1979.935*** 100% 2202.820*** 100%
Decomposition
Direct 1106.794*** 49% 854.337* 43% 1267.948*** 58%
Indirect 1134.641*** 51% 1125.598** 57% 934.873*** 42%
Indirect
Gender 109.792** 5%
Age -20.799 -1% -0.869 0% -21.655 -1%
Year 14.396 1% 0.014 0% 21.518 1%
Leaving Certificate 613.390*** 27% 487.649*** 25% 668.997*** 30%
Risk Willingness 55.145** 2% 149.437* 8% 21.027 1%
Grade 14.557 1% 16.952 1% 11.928 1%
Extraversion 50.929** 2% 12.536 1% 68.857** 3%
Agreeableness 17.644 1% 0.824 0% -9.317 0%
Conscientiousness -17.144 -1% -45.145 -2% -6.684 0%
Neuroticism 14.895 1% -0.625 0% 24.763 1%
Openness 13.752 1% 29.672 1% 10.114 0%
CFC -1.304 0% -15.002 -1% 1.200 0%
College & Subject 269.390 12% 490.156 25% 144.125 7%
Observations 1873 658 1215
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of long run earnings expectations. The first
column estimates the decomposition for the entire sample. The second column estimates the same model for male
students only and the final column estimates the model for female students only. Standard errors were computed
using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.30
Table 10: Long-Run Earnings Decomposition using Father and Mother’s Education Separately
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Sample
Father % All Sample
Mother % Male Father % Female Father % Male Mother % Female
Mother %
Beta 3074.174*** 100% 3510.306*** 100% 2685.064*** 100% 2863.572*** 100% 3147.781*** 100% 3674.172*** 100%
Decomposition
Direct 1320.896*** 43% 1805.640*** 51% 865.300 32% 1552.299*** 54% 1629.526* 52% 2014.194*** 55%
Indirect 1753.278*** 57% 1704.666*** 49% 1819.764** 68% 1311.274*** 46% 1518.255* 48% 1659.978*** 45%
Indirect
Gender 256.292*** 8% 20.381 1%
Age -20.146 -1% -45.766 -1% 12.331 0% -23.869 -1% -18.839 -1% -33.194 -1%
Year 2.072 0% 53.389 2% 3.271 0% -3.413 0% 19.222 1% 77.278 2%
Leaving Certificate 881.885*** 29% 1023.351*** 29% 672.243*** 25% 985.175*** 34% 852.221*** 27% 1073.447*** 29%
Risk Willingness 82.906* 3% 80.897 2% 217.254* 8% 27.844 1% 167.872 5% 45.554 1%
Grade 20.314 1% 18.601 1% 25.083 1% 20.269 1% 29.457 1% 9.377 0%
Extraversion 82.182** 3% 70.770* 2% 21.452 1% 108.138** 4% 23.337 1% 98.782* 3%
Agreeableness 29.709 1% 27.190 1% 4.200 0% -4.885 0% 35.997 1% -22.043 -1%
Conscientiousness -14.013 0% -27.458 -1% -31.775 -1% -3.868 0% -110.353 -4% -0.021 0%
Neuroticism 22.498 1% 23.649 1% -4.594 0% 24.235 1% -0.078 0% 63.980 2%
Openness 21.706 1% 15.726 0% 52.304 2% 16.537 1% 18.669 1% 12.451 0%
CFC 9.057 0% -27.595 -1% 12.459 0% 5.111 0% -85.067 -3% -8.597 0%
College & Subject 378.816 12% 471.531 13% 835.535 31% 159.999 6% 585.814 19% 342.964 9%
Observations 1901 1943 675 1226 685 1258
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of long run earnings expectations. The first column uses father’s education level as the explanatory
variable. The second column estimates the same model but uses mother’s education level as the explanatory variable. Columns 3-6 estimate these two model specifications
separately for male and female respondents. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.31
Appendix 1: Question Wording
Consideration of Future Consequences Question Wording






“For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic
of you
a) I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my
day to day behaviour
b) Often I engage in a particular behaviour in order to achieve outcomes that may not result
for many years
c) I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself
d) My behaviour is only influenced by the immediate i.e. a matter of days or weeks”
TIPI Question Wording
The response scale for this question was:
1 Disagree Strongly
2 Disagree Moderately
3 Disagree a little
4 Neither agree nor disagree
5 Agree a little
6 Agree Moderately
7 Agree Strongly
“Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate next to
each statement the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the
extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly









g) Anxious, easily upset
h) Calm, emotionally stable





Appendix 2: Partial and Total Derivatives
Table A2-1: Partial Derivatives (Table 4)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Sample Male Female




Age 0.505*** 0.658*** 0.407**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.014)
Year -0.852*** -0.892** -0.790**
(0.001) (0.031) (0.011)
Humanities & Arts -1.994 -1.432 -3.089
(0.240) (0.627) (0.139)
Social Science -3.438* -3.751 -3.936*
(0.053) (0.236) (0.069)
Business -2.425 -3.363 -2.609
(0.169) (0.265) (0.234)
Law -5.831*** -4.188 -7.044***
(0.003) (0.226) (0.003)
Science -2.375 -1.967 -3.394
(0.166) (0.507) (0.109)
Maths -3.607* -3.548 -4.659
(0.093) (0.299) (0.107)
Computer Science -3.733* -5.839* -0.025
(0.089) (0.078) (0.994)
Eng/Manu/Const. -3.292* -4.073 -2.680
(0.071) (0.172) (0.274)
Agri/Veterinary -2.775 -6.826* -0.122
(0.243) (0.080) (0.968)
Health/Welfare -2.054 -3.482 -2.145
(0.244) (0.286) (0.315)
Sport/Catering/Serv. -4.101 -3.459 -5.076
(0.224) (0.519) (0.247)
Other -3.302 -6.757* -1.871
(0.110) (0.057) (0.465)
UCD 4.019*** 3.370*** 4.732***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
NUIM 1.164 0.315 1.864*
(0.174) (0.841) (0.067)
NUIG -0.190 0.361 -0.195
(0.825) (0.824) (0.846)
TCD -2.586*** -2.039 -2.745***
(0.001) (0.116) (0.003)
UL 6.316*** 5.126*** 6.896***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
DCU 0.511 -0.704 1.806
(0.653) (0.709) (0.209)
Leaving Certificate 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(cont….)34
Table A2-1: Partial Derivatives (Table 4) - continued
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Sample Male Female
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk Willingness -0.380*** -0.579*** -0.242
(0.002) (0.007) (0.118)
CFC 0.499*** 0.634*** 0.408***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 36.186*** 30.843*** 40.436***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1866 701 1165
R-squared 0.154 0.170 0.166
P-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.135
Table A2-2: Total Derivatives (Table 4)
EQUATION All Sample Males Females
Gender -0.007***
(0.006)
Age -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.038***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
Year -0.001 0.011 -0.008
(0.880) (0.217) (0.250)
Leaving Certificate 4.860*** 5.589*** 4.548***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk Willingness 0.025*** 0.002 0.033***
(0.008) (0.905) (0.005)
CFC 0.010 0.026 0.001
(0.550) (0.366) (0.972)
P-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.136
Table A2-3: Grade Decomposition using Maximum Parental Education
(1) (2)
Total Sample % Total Sample %
Beta 0.194** 100% 0.194** 100%
Decomposition
Direct 0.056 29% 0.055 28%
Total Indirect 0.139 71% 0.139 72%
Indirect
Gender -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2%
Age -0.031** -16% -0.031** -16%
Year -0.004 -2% -0.004 -2%
Leaving Certificate 0.293*** 151% 0.296*** 152%
Risk Willingness -0.020** -10% -0.020** -10%
CFC 0.004 2% 0.004 2%
One Parent -0.002 -1%
College & Subject -0.101 -52% -0.101 -52%
Observations 1979 1979
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of grade decomposition. The first column estimates the
decomposition for the entire sample using maximum parental education as the SES variable. The second column
estimates the same model and also controls for belonging to a one parent family. Standard errors were computed
using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.37
Table A2-4: Partial Derivatives (Table 7)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Sample Male Female
Parental Education 0.526 9.493 15.127
(0.994) (0.942) (0.858)




Year -2,286.869*** -2,030.799*** -2,374.615***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Humanities & Arts -3,761.313* -1,272.177 -5,764.247**
(0.080) (0.732) (0.031)
Social Science -870.942 1,137.898 -2,779.516
(0.703) (0.783) (0.319)
Business -257.183 2,460.644 -2,316.300
(0.908) (0.512) (0.403)
Law 2,970.744 10,839.482** -1,222.456
(0.224) (0.013) (0.682)
Science -201.284 3,132.906 -2,479.146
(0.926) (0.399) (0.360)
Maths 3,098.337 5,831.757 3,127.225
(0.272) (0.197) (0.405)
Computer Science 818.115 2,140.088 1,470.394
(0.774) (0.617) (0.735)
Eng/Manu/Const. -494.485 3,049.749 -4,274.505
(0.830) (0.405) (0.178)
Agri/Veterinary 786.602 2,156.934 294.277
(0.813) (0.726) (0.942)
Health/Welfare 6,010.383*** 12,567.288*** 3,137.702
(0.008) (0.003) (0.254)
Sport/Catering/Serv. -2,828.016 -909.859 -4,935.822
(0.519) (0.902) (0.367)
Other -609.337 2,357.871 -3,049.388
(0.807) (0.593) (0.320)
UCD 701.485 1,475.104 129.405
(0.500) (0.460) (0.916)
NUIM -1,685.042 -2,234.434 -1,331.833
(0.176) (0.361) (0.355)
NUIG -2,392.978** -2,636.789 -2,636.828**
(0.033) (0.217) (0.046)
TCD -1,224.420 -1,902.349 -763.848
(0.257) (0.363) (0.546)
UL -342.660 298.403 -867.489
(0.777) (0.894) (0.551)
DCU -1,142.888 -1,795.616 -535.030
(0.458) (0.545) (0.766)
Leaving Certificate 25.626*** 18.406* 28.355***
(0.000) (0.069) (0.000)
Risk Willingness 722.490*** 876.876** 595.401**
(0.001) (0.023) (0.017)
Grade 184.544 -601.145 596.842
(0.666) (0.442) (0.246)
Extraversion 280.620** -67.695 462.415***
(0.027) (0.771) (0.002)
Agreeableness 216.556 274.379 161.418
(0.145) (0.315) (0.368)
Conscientiousness 218.393* 620.706*** -18.80538
(0.099) (0.00934) (0.907)
Neuroticism -41.971 -317.365 79.021
(0.728) (0.163) (0.579)
Openness 57.693 284.289 -98.544
(0.735) (0.357) (0.634)
CFC 99.268 21.261 138.391
(0.292) (0.903) (0.220)
Constant 5,139.696 6,539.863 3,121.932
(0.389) (0.547) (0.666)
Observations 1873 658 1215
R-squared 0.123 0.128 0.132
P-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.139
Table A2-5: Total Derivatives (Table 7 & 9)
EQUATION All Sample Males Females
Gender -0.006**
(0.017)
Age -0.024** -0.001 -0.038***
(0.012) (0.965) (0.001)
Year -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.227) (0.495) (0.309)
Leaving Certificate 4.367*** 3.960*** 4.658***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk Willingness 0.021** 0.030** 0.014
(0.011) (0.037) (0.167)
CFC -0.002 -0.009 0.002
(0.918) (0.770) (0.912)
Grade 0.011*** 0.016** 0.008*
(0.006) (0.024) (0.089)
Extraversion 0.044*** 0.048** 0.047***
(0.001) (0.035) (0.004)
Agreeableness 0.015 0.039** -0.007
(0.183) (0.033) (0.575)
Conscientiousness -0.039*** -0.046** -0.033**
(0.003) (0.041) (0.038)
Neuroticism -0.034** -0.020 -0.031*
(0.014) (0.377) (0.069)
Openness 0.011 0.018 0.010
(0.282) (0.307) (0.424)
P-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.140
Table A2-6: Partial Derivatives (Table 9)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Sample Male Female
Parental Education 1,106.794*** 854.337* 1,267.948***
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000)




Year -2,231.743* -2.241 -3,221.301**
(0.059) (0.999) (0.021)
Humanities & Arts 23,805.199*** 30,380.974** 17,410.929*
(0.001) (0.018) (0.058)
Social Science 33,817.793*** 52,018.712*** 23,704.301**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Business 41,782.171*** 50,820.220*** 34,184.994***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Law 48,914.835*** 50,215.676*** 44,500.157***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Science 23,380.653*** 27,413.417** 17,870.623*
(0.002) (0.032) (0.056)
Maths 34,121.058*** 40,595.459*** 34,898.129***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.00699)
Computer Science 44,868.569*** 49,878.060*** 40,530.598***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.007)
Eng/Manu/Const. 31,036.166*** 36,917.375*** 29,961.765***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.006)
Agri/Veterinary 17,611.458 35,018.349* 7,223.928
(0.125) (0.098) (0.601)
Health/Welfare 27,474.360*** 41,864.596*** 19,392.826**
(0.000) (0.004) (0.041)
Sport/Catering/Serv. 19,239.566 26,309.653 13,947.460
(0.203) (0.302) (0.459)
Other 37,479.048*** 38,565.874** 33,478.694***
(0.000) (0.011) (0.002)
UCD 5,864.503 3,316.940 6,712.807
(0.102) (0.629) (0.111)
NUIM -4,580.265 -8,898.197 -1,329.063
(0.286) (0.290) (0.788)
NUIG -1,404.510 2,686.592 -4,102.866
(0.716) (0.714) (0.367)
TCD -1,758.609 3,250.787 -3,456.179
(0.637) (0.651) (0.427)
UL -6,435.892 -13,418.279* -1,398.331
(0.123) (0.081) (0.780)
DCU 2,353.988 5,265.961 904.429
(0.656) (0.605) (0.883)
Leaving Certificate 140.571*** 123.148*** 143.808***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk Willingness 2,739.094*** 4,963.435*** 1,700.373**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.046)
Grade 1,345.235 1,080.968 1,485.592
(0.360) (0.687) (0.401)
Extraversion 1,179.038*** 261.459 1,509.577***
(0.007) (0.743) (0.004)
Agreeableness 1,151.486** 20.927 1,546.760**
(0.024) (0.982) (0.012)
Conscientiousness 435.257 987.394 198.21241
(0.340) (0.228) (0.720)
Neuroticism -455.747 31.612 -863.861*
(0.272) (0.968) (0.078)
Openness 1,354.245** 1,651.265 1,165.869
(0.021) (0.119) (0.102)
CFC 857.823*** 1,646.405*** 408.321
(0.008) (0.006) (0.294)
Constant -88,292.777*** -112,040.910*** -85,475.071***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 1873 658 1215
R-squared 0.199 0.192 0.172
P-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.142
Table A2-7: Earnings Decomposition using Maximum Parental Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total
Sample % Total
Sample % Total Sample % Total Sample %
Beta 255.469** 100% 255.469** 100% 3516.665*** 100% 3516.665*** 100%
Decomposition
Direct -63.697 -25% -71.541 -28% 1481.818*** 42% 1475.084*** 42%
Total Indirect 319.166*** 125% 327.010*** 128% 2034.846*** 58% 2041.581*** 58%
Indirect
Gender 16.854 7% 17.077 7% 125.636 4% 125.854 4%
Age -18.475 -7% -18.314 -7% -34.014 -1% -33.857 -1%
Year 29.330 11% 29.424 12% 36.678 1% 36.746 1%
Leaving
Certificate 192.023*** 75% 190.830*** 75% 1086.023*** 31% 1084.803*** 31%
Risk Willingness 30.045** 12% 29.524** 12% 111.010** 3% 110.551** 3%
Grade 2.869 1% 2.816 1% 18.814 1% 18.765 1%
Extraversion 32.588** 13% 31.818** 12% 111.722** 3% 111.074** 3%
Agreeableness 3.761 1% 3.995 2% 30.042 1% 30.261 1%
Conscientiousness -14.315 -6% -14.355 -6% -18.335 -1% -18.362 -1%
Neuroticism 2.553 1% 2.854 1% 25.550 1% 25.811 1%
Openness -0.334 0% -0.131 0% 20.565 1% 20.736 1%
CFC -0.136 0% -0.126 0% -1.863 0% -1.854 0%
One Parent 9.036 4% 7.836 0%
College & Subject 42.402 17% 51.598 20% 523.019 15% 531.054 15%
Observations 1972 1972 1971 1971
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of earnings expectations decomposition. The first column
estimates the decomposition of first salary expectations for the entire sample using maximum parental education as
the SES variable. The second column estimates the same model and also controls for belonging to a one parent
family. The 3
rd and 4
th columns decompose maximum salary expectations. Standard errors were computed using
bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.43
Appendix 3
Table A3-1: Grade Decomposition excluding Anticipated Grades
(1) (2) (3)
Total Sample % Male % Female %
Beta 0.144** 100% 0.216** 100% 0.114 100%
Decomposition
Direct 0.024 16% 0.096 45% -0.022 -20%
Total Indirect 0.120* 84% 0.120 55% 0.136* 120%
Indirect
Gender -0.002 -2%
Age -0.013* -9% -0.031 -14% -0.006 -6%
Year 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.001 1%
Leaving Certificate 0.201*** 140% 0.190*** 88% 0.214*** 189%
Risk Willingness -0.011* -8% -0.005 -2% -0.009 -8%
CFC 0.011 8% 0.040* 19% 0.002 1%
College & Subject -0.066 -46% -0.076 -35% -0.066 -58%
Observations 1405 518 887
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the results from a number of grade decompositions. Only students who reported realised
grades were included in this analysis. The first column estimates the decomposition for the entire sample. The
second column estimates the same model for male students only and the final column estimates the model for
female students only. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.